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The resurgence of pro-Biafra movements led by the likes of MOSSOB and IPOB over the past six to
seven years is proof of the failed accountability the Nigerian government has displayed in addressing
the trauma of the Biafran war. Nigeria’s deliberate choice to ignore particular aspects of its history is a
reflection of its refusal to adequately address the impact of state violence on its people. The labeling
and crackdown on these groups, as extremists that pose a threat to Nigerian security, disregards the
principle issues that allow for the existence of these groups in the first place. While understandings
regarding the need for a Biafra to exist vary between the present and past, the underlying tension
between the state and these secessionists groups remains the same: The protection of Nigerian
security continues to be more important than the people who make up the state. In this study, I
examine how the use of language, such as “extremists” or “terrorists” by the Nigerian government in
labeling various protest groups and, particularly in the Southeastern region, functions as an attempt
by the Nigerian government to maintain control over the area’s resources and invalidate the concerns
of the peoples in those areas to the general public. This has resulted in the proliferation of further
tension between state and minority groups.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Otuonye, Chinonye A. (2019) "The Fight for Language: An Exploration of the Nigerian State’s Response to Protest Groups in
Southeastern Nigeria," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 2: 106-115.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1699
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol13/iss2/10
Keywords.
Biafra, pro-Biafra movements, language, power, labeling
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
Chinonye Alma Otuonye. “The Fight for Language: An Exploration of the Nigerian State’s Response to Protest Groups in 
Southeastern Nigeria” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, 2 (2019): 106-115. ©2019 Genocide Studies and Prevention.  
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1699
The Fight for Language: An Exploration of the Nigerian State’s Response 
to Protest Groups in Southeastern Nigeria
Chinonye Alma Otuonye
CUNY, Graduate Center
New York City, New York, USA 
“Remember Biafra!” These are the chants that can be heard along the unpaved dirt roads of small 
Southeastern villages in Nigeria; a region abundantly prosperous in oil, but simultaneously 
underdeveloped. People are tired. They are tired of corrupt officials siphoning off their wealth 
to line their own pockets. People are tired of feeling forgotten and most of all people are tired of 
feeling voiceless. The contemporary call for Biafra is more than a vocal memorial to the past; it is a 
form of defense, for some, against what they perceive as a failing Nigerian state.
The Biafran-Nigerian War, predominately against Igbos, was largely unacknowledged by 
the Nigerian state, ended fifty years ago. While only lasting three years, it left a scar on a nation 
and on a people that has never fully been allowed to heal. It reinvigorated and politicized the 
significance of the Igbo identity within a people who understood the numerous barriers facing 
them due to perceived discriminatory practices and interactions. For a struggle grounded in the 
superficial construction of the Nigerian state and the forced cohesion of a multiplicity of ethnic 
groups, its end sought to ignore fundamental issues and instead forge a united path on a crumpled 
foundation. Fifty years later, a secessionist state that failed to survive has found its way out of 
the mangles of the past and into the forefront of a Nigerian present that is riddled with threats of 
terror and on the brink of an unquestionable future. The question of why Biafra has been revived 
has failed to register adequately with both local and federal Nigerian government officials. To ask 
that question assumes a prioritization of an understanding of the people’s needs and a means of 
resolution towards a growing discontent.  Rather, Nigerian forces have engineered a forceful push 
towards action to remedy what they understand as a threat to the nation.
The resurgence of pro-Biafra movements led by the likes of the Movement of Sovereign State 
of Biafra (MOSSOB) and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) for more than a decade is a 
testament to the failed accountability of the Nigerian government to address the trauma of the 
Biafran war. The need to organize around a historical moment speaks to the presence of the past 
for a generation failed by Nigeria’s democratization process. It speaks to cleavages within ethnic 
groups between the elite and non-elite and begs the question of whether historical memory is 
integral to the legitimization of violence. Nigeria’s choice to ignore particular aspects of its history 
showcases its inadequacy to address the impact of state violence on its people. The labeling of and 
crackdown on these groups, as extremists that pose a threat to Nigerian security, disregards the 
core issues that allows these groups to exist. While an acknowledgement of the need’s of Biafra 
vary between the present and past context, the underlying tension between the state and these 
secessionists groups remains the same: the protection of Nigerian security remains more important 
than the people who comprise the state. 
This article aims to understand the ways in which language serves as a tool to invalidate the 
claims of citizens, which, in turn, fosters further tension between the state and minority groups 
rather than ameliorating them.  I will focus on the ways in which the use of language, inclusive 
of “extremists” or “criminals” by the Nigerian government in labeling various protest groups in 
the Southeastern region, functions to assert control over the resource rich areas as well as public 
perception. This, thereafter, functions to justify violence towards these groups in the name of 
national security. 
Language and Power
In the fight for a nationalistic identity, language plays a significant role in determining who controls 
and maintains power and how power can be used to exercise violence. The words chosen by political 
leaders have meaning that in many ways bypass that of everyday language, given the established 
power associated with these figures. The words we choose are purposeful in order to attain a goal. 
Whether we aim to persuade, command, flatter, or deceive, the words that help facilitate those 
ends, matter. With regards to the political arena, words have even larger significance. They have 
an influence on policy, resource distribution, development, and may have an implicit influence on 
security. As noted by Michaela Mocanu’s article focusing on the use of political language, language 
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in the political arena highlights a power hierarchy between those who speak and those forced to 
listen. As the speaker, there is a presumption of power in that one is afforded the right to speak thus 
relegating the listener to silence.
The relationship between word and power in this context becomes one of interdependence, 
thus having one means conquering the other.  The powerful individual is not the only one 
who speaks, but the only one entitled to do it, the efficiency of a political discourse depending 
not only on the degree of transparency and intelligibility, but also on the status of the people 
mentioned.1 
The speaker then can be understood as an authority figure whose words need to be adhered to 
and respected. The speaker is, therefore, the powerful part. As noted by Coates and Wade in their 
2007 article on “Language and Violence,”
in democratic societies, political power is linked to the management of information and the 
power of rhetoric.  The ability of any group to advance its interest hinges in part on the 
groups’ ability to publicize its perspectives as more truthful or reasonable than others.2 
Whose voice matters?  Individuals outside the network of institutions in which credibility is 
given must fight for their voices to be heard beyond that of state institutions that have an inherent 
power in the lives of the masses. While Nigeria has seen itself move from a colonial to a military 
state to a democracy, it has been riddled with corruption and mismanagement. Its credibility and 
monopoly on influence through narrative is derived from an inherent belief among the populace in 
the capacity of the Nigerian state, as a moral authority that must be adhered to, but has rather been 
established as a result of who has power [wealth] and who has access to that power. 
That is not to say that outside of institutions, individuals are voiceless and, therefore, powerless, 
but that institutions often times have the ability to “use language strategically in combination with 
physical or authority-based power to manipulate public appearances, promote their accounts in 
public discursive space, entrap victims, conceal violence, and avoid responsibility.”3 The issue of 
language is, thus, also inextricably linked to how marginalized groups experience violence and 
how that violence is reduced.
Words serve a purpose and the discursive space is always used as a means through which to 
achieve a goal. With democratically elected political institutions which are supposed to speak for 
the people, protect the people, and fight for the people, there is an assumption the language of a 
country’s political arena will be employed to ensure the safety of its people. There is an assumption 
that upon discontent, those in positions of power will pull back from language that is dismissive, 
alienating, and divisive. In the Nigerian context, however, we see time and time again the ways in 
which language is used as a tool to disregard the dialogic space and maintain power and control.  
A History of Biafra
From its inception, Nigeria, as a nation-state, has been built around struggles for power and an 
underlying refusal towards the right of self-determination. As a product of colonialism, Nigeria 
found itself and its boundaries delineated by powers outside itself. Its people were refused a voice 
in its conception and forced under the directive of the British colonial powers. The land, its peoples, 
and its resources were used without consent. In this sense, Nigeria has seemingly known no other 
narrative than that of power, greed, and a disregard for the voices of its people. The story began 
with an assumption among colonial authorities of the impossibility of black self-rule.  Following 
Hegelian modes of thought, the black mind could only be ruled by emotions, seemingly the most 
basic of human capabilities. This perceived lack of ability of black beings to evolve towards the 
rationality of their white counterparts necessitated the imposition of white bodies in a black space. 
The colonial administrators perceived it as their moral duty to civilize the barbarian. 
3 Ibid.
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The race for Africa saw the greed of European nations breaking apart and putting together the 
nation states of the African continent at their will. The amalgamation of the Nigerian state saw 
the combining of its Northern, Southwestern, and Southeastern sections into one unified whole. 
Nigeria was to be Britain’s brain child. Upon its independence in 1960, it would showcase the 
ways in which diversity need not be an impediment to progress; Nigeria, despite its numerous 
ethnic and linguistic enclaves, was to transcend difference. However, independence brought 
with it an exacerbation of ethnic tensions. For peoples grounded in identification through ethnic 
understanding, British colonization served to complicate the issue of identity; an independent 
Nigerian state found itself imposing a Nigerian identity that its people had yet to fully integrate 
into their own understandings of self.
With colonial powers increasingly losing control over their territories, Nigeria’s independence 
was thus an inevitability, or, as Achebe would later note, “Nigeria was given her freedom ‘on 
a platter of gold.’”4 Nigeria’s independence then was more a result of changing times than an 
overwhelming struggle that ended British imperialism. This is not to negate the overwhelming 
actions taken by the peoples towards their political liberation, but to note the ways in which Nigerian 
independence functioned as a replacement of bodies in power. Freedom is always a struggle; it is 
a fight that necessitates a change of systems that function as oppressive to the overall progress of 
its people. If freedom is then not gained but “given on a plate”5 then it follows that the hegemonic 
powers that led to the creation of the Nigerian state and the power differentials that permeated 
Nigerian society remained. British officials were replaced by a Nigerian elite and the establishment 
of sectarian governments in the North and South, distinctly separated by three major political 
parties (the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG), and the National Council 
of Nigerian and Cameroons (NCNC)) that functioned as safeguards for the three major ethnic 
groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo),6 only perpetuated a nation’s struggle towards unity and 
a real freedom from years of colonial oppression. As a newly independent nation, Nigeria’s elite 
aimed to secure power through galvanizing its peoples through ethnic identity rather than a united 
national identity. In other words, “the weakness of the Nigerian political system, was that it never 
developed centripetal forces capable of counteracting the centrifugal ones.”7 In this manner, Biafra 
was a war of inevitability; a foreseeable catastrophe.  
Biafra’s story begins in 1966, with a coup lead by Igbo military personnel. As noted, 
independence brought with it fragmentation and continued corruption that saw its answer in rising 
resentment. General Ironsi, an Igbo man, took power and fearing an Igbo government take-over, 
a countercoup occurred leading to the killings of a hundred Igbo officers and pogroms forcing 
millions of Igbos refugees back east.8 Biafra’s existence was one that was not merely of its own 
wanting but a necessity for peoples fleeing to the east with stories of violence, death, and fear. 
A sergeant ordered that all Easterners should raise up their hands…The sergeant asked 
us whether we could remember what happened on January 15th when the prime minister 
[Balewa] and the premier of the North [the Sardauna of Sokoto] lost their lives and the Ibos 
were all very happy.  We said, “No, Sergeant.” Paying no heed to that he asked us to give our 
names and addresses and send any messages we have for our people because we were going 
to die…They drove us five miles away to the Katsina road, brought us down and started 
shooting us.  I felt my leg shattered and I fell down…I managed to crawl into the bush.9
In 1967, under the leadership of Cornel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra declared 
itself a state. Using the language of liberation, it took the fear and need for survival of its people 
and used both to propel its cause, as a fight, towards black liberation and full decolonization. In a 
4 Chinua Achebe, There Was a Country: A personal History of Biafra (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 52.
5 Ibid.
6 Arthur Aguwuncha Nwankwo and Samuel Udochukwu Ifejika, The Making of a Nation: Biafra (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, 1969), 24-25; Chima J Korieh, “Biafra and the Discourse on the Igbo Genocide,” Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 48, no. 6 (2013), 729.
7 K.W.J. Post, “Is There a Case for Biafra?,” International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1968), 30.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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moment of deep-seated fear, Ojukwu and his political officials were both able to use the language 
of state liberation, as a means to rally their constituents around the existence of Biafra, and belief 
in its preservation. 
Though this present Biafran resurgence can be understood as a new struggle against Nigeria, 
the Nigerian forces’ response is not unique to this present context. As the Nigerian administration 
maintains their goal remains national unity, the impetus of the original war, as vocalized by the 
Nigerian government, was that of unity. The necessity of General Gowon’s tactics against the 
seceded Biafra nation was necessary under the premise that “Biafra wrecked the unity of a happy 
and harmonious state.”10 As noted on the second anniversary of Biafra, Ojukwu’s Ahiara Declaration 
set the tone for the ways in which Biafra would engage in their violent struggle as a result of what 
could be understood not only as a fight against the colonial construction of Nigerian rule but also 
the very present danger of the loss of a people. However, in thinking about the responses of both 
the 1967 Nigerian and Biafran governments, the recognition of oil that made Biafra an international 
struggle of sorts needs to be contextualized.  British involvement in their former colony as a result 
of oil relations that they had established and maintained through their colonial administration 
highlights how Biafra was not simply a struggle for national unity as put forth by the 1967 Nigerian 
government.
Moreover, the political project of Biafra could well have broken up the oil and banking 
connections which helped to feed the British economy.  In the crunch, the British looked 
to their Northern clients, whom they had had to persuade, time and again, to the idea 
of Nigerian unity, but who had always proved easy to manipulate, in part because the 
federation provided the North with access to the sea.  Biafra, then, was an economic threat 
to England…11
Ojuwku, on the other hand, sought to ground Biafra in a history that superseded that of Nigeria 
and, therefore, any such requirement towards Nigerian unity. Fighting against a belief in Africa 
ahistoricity, Ojukwu’s “Introducing the Republic of Biafra” sought to formulate an existence for 
Biafra grounded in the notion of it as a pre-colonial state that necessitated post-colonial recognition 
and devotion from its citizens.
It is a country inhabited from very early times by much of the same people as live there 
today. The people evolved a political system which for hundreds of years allowed each of 
the small component groups to manage its own affairs but all the same time to regain certain 
cultural and economic links that bound the country into a relatively peaceful homogeneous 
unit.12
However, despite efforts to showcase the ingenuity of Biafrans to the eastern region in 
response to ongoing violence, Biafran political leaders understood their cause as embedded in black 
liberation struggles. As described in the Ahiara Declaration, they understood their proclamation 
for a state as a physical manifestation of anticolonial rhetoric. The Ahiara Declaration, released on 
the second anniversary of the establishment of the Biafran state, sought to revive a people that had 
regularly knew the trauma of starvation and death. It was a declaration proclaiming Biafra could 
not lose and Biafrans could and should not lose hope; after all Biafra needed them just as much 
as they needed Biafra. While Nigeria was engaging in its own propaganda strategies, Ojukwu’s 
Ahiara declaration worked to retell the story of Biafra. It detailed the ways in which the Biafran 
cause was not simply a product of civil strife, but of a colonial rule that refused to extricate itself 
entirely.
But what do we find here in Negro Africa? The Federation of Nigeria is today as corrupt, as 
unprogressive and as oppressive and irreformable as the Ottoman Empire was in Eastern 
10 Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1977), 1.
11 Stanley Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra,” Dialectical Anthropology 31, no. 1/3 (2007), 353.
12 “Introducing the Republic of Biafra.” Enugu: Government of the Republic of Biafra, May 30, 1967, accessed May 20, 
2015, http://www.biafraland.com/Biafra history.htm.
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Europe over a century ago. And in contrast, the Nigerian Federation in the form it was 
constituted by the British cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered an African 
necessity. Yet we are being forced to sacrifice our very existence as a people to the integrity of 
that ramshackle creation that has no justification either in history or in the freely expressed 
wishes of the people. What other reason for this can there be than the fact that we are black?13
Assuming that Biafra functioned, as a cure for the black man towards a true independence, 
its survival, thus, became a necessity in order to provide a nation to a people allowed to rule 
themselves, protect themselves, promote themselves, and benefit themselves.  
While the Ahiara Declaration was a reinvigoration of what Biafra stood for and why it was 
needed; the idea of what its existence would mean could not coexist with the reality of what its 
existence would cause. In 1970, Biafra became no more and with a motto “no victors, no vanquish” 
the east was reintegrated back into Nigeria. Biafran survivors, regardless of socio-economic status 
were stripped of their former lives. Their Biafran currency became null and void in Nigeria and 
some were given 20 pounds each regardless of their previous lives. Preferential treatment for 
government jobs was given to Yoruba and Hausa despite policies toward equal ethnic representation 
and equality. Such government mandated policies encouraged a silencing of the horrors of war, 
a disregard for the violence the war caused to the Igbo ethnic group, and perpetuated distrust 
among the ethnic groups the reintegration was aimed to bring back together. 
Government and Secessionist Groups
Twenty years later, the silence lives on. Monuments and memorials remain largely unmade, a small 
yet significant aspect of the Nigerian story remains untaught in schools; the youth largely remain 
unaware of the intricacies of a war that left its mark on Nigeria as whole. Yet, despite a formalized 
silence by the government, there exists a renewed interest in Biafra. Groups like MASSOB and 
IPOB have popped up over the past two decades in response to what they believe to be as ongoing 
discrimination against the Eastern part of Nigeria. In a post-1999 Nigeria, a prevalent feeling of 
exclusion from Nigeria politics and the overall making of a new Nigeria remains; whether this is 
understood, as a result of governmental corruption or Igbo elite led corruption, for MASSOB and 
IPOB these have worked towards the detriment to Igbo progress.14
The idea of intergenerational trauma is one that cannot be ignored when thinking about the 
impact of the Biafran-Nigerian war on a new generation that is mostly calling for the same end. 
While Biafra remains largely in the rearview mirror of the older generation, a younger generation 
is bringing the wounds of the war back into public discourse.15 With the inception of groups like 
MASSOB and IPOB, there is a clear divide within an older Biafran generation wishing never again 
to see the horrors of war and this new generation who view reclaiming Biafran sovereignty as a 
continued fight towards the right to self-rule they were denied. They are a generation who view the 
legacy of violence influencing their ability to adequately lead the lives owed to them.
However, prevailing sociopolitical and economic context and the emergence of new actors 
and forces in the Nigerian public space have served to strengthen manifestations of Igbo 
nationalism as it went through processes of change and renewal in the post-1970 era.16
13 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration: The Principles of the Biafran Revolution (Geneva: Markpress, 
1969), 10.
14 Daniel Smith, “Corruption Complaints, Inequality, and Ethnic Grievances in Post-Biafra Nigeria,” Third World Quarterly 
35, no. 5 (2014), 791.
15 Daniel Smith in his work on corruption in the context of a post-Biafra Nigeria notes that outside of the Diasporic 
Igbos who have made prevalent the fight for Biafra, the local activists exist seemingly within the poor populations 
(particularly men) in urban spaces. These men are often Okada drivers who seem to symbolize the complexities, 
risks, and precarity of the Nigerian urban landscape. While the older generation are sympathetic towards pro-Biafra 
sentiments, they are aware that Biafra, at least for them, is a lost past.   
16 Godwin Onuoha, “Contesting the Space: The “New Biafra” and Ethno-Territorial Separatism in South-Eastern Nigeria,” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 17, no. 4 (December 2011), 408.
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They are a generation that invoke memories of the Abandoned Property Edict of 1969 that left 
their grandfathers/mothers’ abandoning their homes and businesses during the war and without 
any compensation after the war’s end.17 Despite their acknowledgement of corruption among Igbo 
elite, there is a steadfast belief that recompense is owed to them. 
In an attempt to bring Biafra back into conversation, MASSOB and IPOB have been organized 
young Easterners, particularly Igbos living in the East, together to make their voices heard; they 
aim to unravel the sense of secrecy that has become normalized within Nigerian public and private 
life.18 However, in an attempt to silence the voices of the Eastern youth, the Nigerian government 
has engaged in dismissal tactics, which has allowed for the continuation of challenges to state 
legitimacy.
…different ethnic groups have continued to challenge the legitimacy of the Nigerian state, 
demanding a radical restructuring of the federal project in a manner that would accommodate 
their aspirations, interests, and desires.19
Nigeria has a rich history of struggle in response to what is understood as government repression 
against peoples. With movements such the Ogoni oil crisis, which sparked an international inquiry 
into the role and responsibility governments have over private companies, and the corporate 
responsibility of private companies in ensuring and maintaining human rights practices, Nigeria 
has struggled to find the necessary language that promotes engagement with rather than distrust of.
MASSOB started in 1999 under the relatively auspicious leadership of Chief Ralph Uwazuruike. 
With the inadequacies of post-civil war reconciliation, MASSOB represented a rebirth of a nationalist 
movement towards Igbo self-determination grounded in the idea of unequal treatment of Igbos 
socially and politically.20 With an understanding of the horrors and consequences of war and 
examples of methods towards nonviolence in the fight for freedom, MASSOB understands itself 
as a movement that follows the likes of India and the US.21 With flashbacks of the past, its aim is to 
remove violence from a freedom agenda. In a declaration concerning their demands, Uwazurike 
continually claimed to use the language of peace and dialogue in advancing his movement. For 
him, the overall aim is not to harm anyone, but the complete freedom of an Igbo people who have 
faced unrecognized trauma and discrimination. 
MASSOB has therefore packaged about 25 stages for the actualization of the sovereignty 
of the new Biafra State through Non-violence and Non Exodus.  By this process, no single 
life is expected to be lost in the realization of our new Biafra State. This method has worked 
in various countries, including India.  The process admits of negotiations, dialogue and 
consultation.  It also admits of non co-operative and passive resistance to oppressive and 
obnoxious laws of the authorities.  Having hoisted the flag of our new Biafra today, we 
wish to declare our resolve to demand and pursue the realization of our sovereignty from 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  We therefore call on the Federal Government of Nigeria to 
open up negotiation with MASSOB without any further delay for the realization of the new 
Biafra State.22
MASSOB, therefore, purports to represent a liberation struggle for the youth. With an Eastern 
region that is struggling with adequate access to education, structural improvements, and the 
lack of a fully representative federal government, MASSOB understands the reality of Biafra as a 
necessity to protect the Igbo youth of today and the future. 
17 Smith, Corruption Complaints, 792.
18 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “Hiding From Our Past,” The New Yorker, May 1, 2014, accessed March 21, 2016, https://
www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/hiding-from-our-past.
19 Onuoha, Contesting the Space, 408.
20 Ibid.
21 Ralph Uwazuruike, “Declaration of Our Demand for a Sovereign State of New Biafra,” Biafra Nation, May 21, 2000, 
accessed April 4, 2016, http://www.biafraland.com/Declaration Of Our Demand For A Sovereign State Of New Biafra.
htm.
22 Ibid.
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Yet, despite the use of nonviolent language and civil disobedience tactics, Biafra elicits a 
reference to a past that many believe should be long forgotten. With a public that does not fully 
understand the weight of the war on the present situation of Easterners and a Nigerian government 
with a tendency towards violence as a response, the narrative around a renewed Biafra has changed 
the story that the likes of MASSOB and IPOB have tried to create.  
Simply put, for the Nigerian administration, Biafra is a tangible threat to national unity.  A 
2008 report by the US State Department on human rights abuses and practices in Nigeria noted the 
Nigerian government’s response to groups they believed to be a threat. Such responses included 
the multiple arrests of MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazuruike, random arrests and detentions of those 
believed to be members of such groups.23 In other words, the Nigerian government has made 
efforts to systemically silence the voices they do not like. Those voices only serve to open up past 
wounds and possibly garner support for their cause. They have accused MASSOB members of 
violence and labeled them “common criminals” and “armed robbers.”24 MASSOB has maintained 
it is a nonviolent organization whose members have been subjected to human rights abuses at the 
hands of Nigerian forces.25
MASSOB is not alone, however, in being on the receiving end of maltreatment. The Indigenous 
People of Biafra (IPOB), led by Nnamdi Kanu, has increasingly become the face of pro-Biafra 
movements over the past several years. As with its predecessor in MASSOB that “drew from a 
collective sense of Igbo heroics and achievements in the past, and a perception of deprivation, 
marginalization, and injustice against Igbo in the Nigerian state,” IPOB and Kanu have propagated 
imagery to illicit a strong sense of Igbo identity.26 Their website states that IPOB are the “original 
inhabitants and owners of the Lands and Communities of Biafra and Biafraland spanning centuries 
of tradition and historical ancient cultural ties.”27 This serves as a reference to the Ahiara Declaration 
that outlined the existence of Biafra long before colonial rule.  
However, despite its appeals to an older time, IPOB has yet to receive full support from the 
Eastern community. Though they understand them and their Eastern brothers and sisters to be 
“slaves” in a government run by the Hausa-Fulani,28 their inability to have the backing of the 
majority of Easterners (both young and old) and outside international support towards their causes 
has provided space for the Nigerian government to shape them as a violent organization terrorizing 
the Eastern region and disregarding the values of a democratic society. In an effort to neutralize 
such a threat, the violence used by Nigerian forces is justified through the use of rhetoric likening 
groups such as MASSOB and IPOB to a threat against Nigeria and its peoples. 
IPOB campaigners say they are committed to peaceful protests, but their demonstrations 
prompted the military to issue an “unequivocal warning” that efforts to bring about the 
“dismemberment of the country” would be crushed.29 
The campaign against dissent waged by the Nigerian security forces has seen them justify the 
deaths of hundreds as this movement towards self-rule continues. The use of violent language has 
given way to the use of violent action. A June 2016 Amnesty International news report found “that 
between 29-30 May 2016, the Nigerian military opened fire on members of the Indigenous people 
23 United States Department of State. “Nigeria.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008, February 25, 2009, 
accessed April 4, 2016, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119018.htm.
24 Senan Murray, “Reopening Nigeria’s Civil War Wounds,” BBC, May 30, 2007, accessed March 22, 2016, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/6657259.stm.
25 “Nigeria: Government Cracks Down on Biafra Separatist Resurgence,” Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 
September 2006, accessed April 15, 2016, http://www.irinnews.org/report/53971/nigeria-government-cracks-down-
biafra-secessionist-movement.
26 Onuoha, Contesting the Space, 412.
27 Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), “About Us,” ipob.org (blog), accessed March 22, 2016, http://www.ipob.org/p/blog-
page_18.html. 
28 Ibid.
29 Alex Akwagyiram, “Decades after Nigeria’s War, New Biafra Movement Grows,” Reuters, November 30, 2015, accessed 
April 3, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-politics-biafra-insight-idUSKBN0TJ1WM20151130. 
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of Biafra (IPOB), supporters and bystanders at three locations in [Onitsha, Anambra state].”30 To 
Nigerian security, however, the force and deaths were justified in that they were result of self-
defense.31 Though they have claimed less people were killed and that members of IPOB murdered 
two policemen, Amnesty international could find no proof of such claims.32 In Amnesty’s annual 
report on Nigeria, it found that “on 9 February, soldiers and police officers shot at about 200 IPOB 
members who had gathered for a prayer meeting at the National High School in Aba, in Abia 
state.”33 With the 50th anniversary of the Nigerian-Biafran War coming up, there was mounting 
worry that Nigerian security forces would engage in the same behavior that lead over 60 people 
being gun down last year. In response, Osai Ojigho, Director of Amnesty International Nigeria, 
called on Nigerian security forces “to conduct themselves in a manner that [would] ensure public 
order without resorting to force.”34 Though little is done in the name of justice for those killed 
by Nigerian forces, Nigeria has now thrust itself further into the international spotlight with its 
treatment of dissenting voices. 
Following this logic and in the name of protecting the unity of Nigeria, separatist groups need 
to be done away with. However, the voices of its members (the most vulnerable) fail to reach the 
ears of those in power. Groups like MASSOB and IPOB have been able to live on despite continued 
governmental threats and repression because they reach an audience who already felt excluded. 
With growing unemployment, numerous college graduates, and an Eastern region that has yet to 
be adequately developed, young Easterners are the targets of a pro-Biafra message that promises 
better days ahead. “Of course I’m in support of Biafra,” said a 28-year-old wholesale food trade, 
Uchenna Ede. “If we are freed, the eastern part of Nigeria would have a huge turnaround.”35
Voices like Uchenna are the ones most hurt. Living within the current moment and in such 
precarious times, voices like Uchenna represent the worries of a younger generation who feel 
abandoned.  MASSOB and IPOB have capitalized on these feelings of discontent and have worked 
to mobilize around history and memory. However, while this cry for Biafra calls for the creation 
of an Igbo majority state, this feeling is not necessarily shared. The lack of unity on the topic of 
Biafra among Igbo while important should not dismiss other concerns that pro-Biafra sentiments 
bring up. Biafra, while understood as an Igbo struggle in particular, is an area that encompasses a 
multiplicity of minority identities. However, this connotation of Biafra with Igboness provides little 
room for other claims of sovereignty within the area. Biafra is, thus, created as a nation using Igbo 
nationalism that hinges upon Igbo identity formation. The nationalism functions to overshadow 
the ways in which minority groups within the East engage in their own identity formations.36 
Originally Biafra channeled notions of Pan-Africanism and was, as such, meant to be an inclusive 
state that recognized the multiplicity of identities within it. However, newer thinking on the issue 
can be understood to be predominately Igbo led as well as centralized under Igbo emotive ethnic 
understandings of self. This nexus between minority rights and the implications of creating of 
Biafran state needs to be considered seriously, however, Nigeria’s response is not that of protection 
mechanisms for minorities against Igbo hegemonic dominance, but rather one that seemingly 
functions to maintain Nigerian control.  
The forces being used against young and frustrated Easterners only further perpetuates the 
idea that Biafra’s secession is a real necessity to the Eastern region’s ability to flourish. The Biafra of 
30 “Nigeria: Killing of Unarmed Pro-Biafra supporters by military must be urgently investigated,” Amnesty International, 
June 10, 2016, accessed July 15, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/nigeria-killing-of-unarmed-
pro-biafra-supporters-by-military-must-be-urgently-investigated/.
31 Ike Okonta, “Biafra of the mind: MASSOB and the mobilization of history,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 2/3 (2014).
32 Ibid.
33 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/2017-Nigeria, February 22, 2017, accessed April 18, 2018, https://
www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-825X.2018.08279.x
34 “Nigeria: Security Forces Must Avoid Repression of Biafra Day Protest,” Amnesty International, May 30, 2017, accessed 
July 21, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/nigeria-security-forces-must-avoid-repression-of-
biafra-day-protests/.
35 Alex Akwagyiram, “Decades after Nigeria’s War, New Biafra Movement Grows,” Reuters, November 30, 2015, accessed 
April 3, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-politics-biafra-insight-idUSKBN0TJ1WM20151130. 
36 Smith, Corruption Complaints, 794.
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old was a stance against the power of the colonial experience in the functioning of African politics. 
Biafra is not simply a threat to Nigerian existence, but to the hegemonic powers that brought Nigeria 
about to begin with. Fifty years later, this call for Biafra is a recycled stance towards freedom etched 
with the bitterness and disappointment of youth that have yet to see how their lives have been 
made better by Nigerian unification; of youth who are aware of the violence their parents and 
grandparents faced, and who feel as though justice has never been delivered.  
On a continent that had its fate decided for it rather than by it, its peoples are still navigating 
what is means to have emerged from within a conception of the state in which they had zero 
voice. The cry for Biafra and the response by Nigerian forces highlight a tension between a need 
to remain and a need to reexamine. The inability to see the violence perpetrated against a people 
some fifty years past and the implications of the violence to the power and strength of their voice 
further undermines a group that already feels systematically oppressed and neglected.  Rather 
than engage in dialogue towards understanding, the Nigerian government has waived a dismissive 
hand at their claims and only further proved their point…that they live within a nation that has no 
regard for their fears and wounds. Instead, Nigerian forces continually seek to alter the narrative 
of the Biafran story in the hopes that if they can change the story they can change people’s minds. 
They have used a language of security as a means of justifying violence and in the process shown 
how disposable they view their own people. 
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